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Abstract
This paper measures credit risk in prime money market funds (MMFs), studies how
such credit risk evolved in 2011-2012, and tests the efficacy of the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC) January 2010 reforms. To accomplish this, we estimate the credit de-
fault swap premium (CDS) needed to insure each fund’s portfolio against credit losses. We
also calculate by Monte Carlo the cost of insuring a fund against losses amounting to over
50 basis points. We find that credit risk of prime MMFs rose from June to December 2011
before receding in 2012. Contrary to common perceptions, this did not primarily reflect
funds’ credit exposure to eurozone banks. Instead, credit risk in prime MMFs rose because
of the deteriorating credit outlook of banks in the Asia/Pacific region. Finally, we find evi-
dence that the SEC’s 2010 liquidity and weighted average life (WAL) requirements reduced
the credit risk of prime MMFs.
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1 Introduction
Money market funds (MMFs) are mutual funds that invest in short-term high quality money
market instruments. Unlike banks, money market funds do not hold capital against credit
losses, nor are they insured by the federal government. Instead, risks in money market funds
are mitigated by SEC Rule 2a-7, which is promulgated under the Investment Company Act.
Among other things, Rule 2a-7 sets strict maturity limits on a fund’s portfolio, requires funds
to hold short-term securities of high credit quality, imposes diversification limits, and requires
MMFs to hold a significant portion of their portfolios in very liquid assets. Money market
funds have no leverage and must hold only U.S. dollar-denominated assets. These limits are
in many ways much more stringent than the rules under which banks operate.
Money market funds, like banks and other financial institutions, faced extraordinary stresses
in September 2008 in light of the U.S. federal government’s decision to let Lehman Brothers
fail.1 In January 2010, in an effort to improve the resiliency of money market funds to with-
stand severe market stresses, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2010) adopted a
number of wide-ranging revisions to Rule 2a-7.
Since 2010, many regulators have called for further reforms to money market funds. One
rationale offered for such reforms is the suggestion that money market funds take significant
credit risk (Rosengren, 2012). However, to date, there has been little formal research assessing
the credit risk in money market funds. This paper seeks to fill that gap. This paper develops
a methodology for assessing MMF credit risk and applies it to the period 2011-2012 to study
the influence of the European debt crisis on the credit quality of money market fund portfolios
and on the influence of the SEC’s 2010 reforms on funds’ credit risk.
At first glance, the most obvious way to estimate the credit risk on an MMF is by the
difference between the yield on a prime money market fund and the yield on a comparable
government-only money market fund. Prime MMFs are money market funds that invest in
a range of money market securities, including commercial paper, bank CDs, medium-term
and floating-rate notes, repurchase agreements (repos) and Treasury and agency securities.
Government money market funds typically invest only in Treasury or agency securities or
1See FCIC (2011), chapter 18, for an account and links to first-hand documents describing the federal govern-
ment’s decision on September 14, 2008 to provide no funding in support of a Lehman Brothers bailout or takeover.
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repos backed by Treasuries and agencies and therefore should be default-risk-free. Figure 1
plots month-end values of the difference between the average gross yield on prime MMFs and
government MMFs. For comparison, the figure also plots month-end values of the Bloomberg
index of 5-year credit default swap (CDS) premiums for U.S. banks, as well as of the iTraxx
5-year CDS premium index for senior European financial debt (which primarily reflects 5-year
CDS premiums for eurozone banks). As seen, in comparison with the 5-year CDS premiums
for banks, the prime-to-government yield spread is small. Over the period 2011 to 2012, this
spread averaged 18 basis points and the maximum spread was 23 basis points. This suggests
that the credit risk of prime money market funds is small.
An issue arises, however, because money market funds price their portfolio holdings at
amortized cost. A longstanding GAAP provision allows firms, both financial and nonfinan-
cial, to value their holdings of money market securities at amortized cost. A provision of SEC
Rule 2a-7 allows a money market fund to price all of its securities at amortized cost (but the
fund must abide by the risk-limiting requirements of Rule 2a-7). The use of amortized cost may
weaken the value of a prime-to-government yield spread as an indicator of a money market
fund’s credit risk. A fund calculates its yield as income accrued (on an amortized cost basis)
over a given period (e.g., one month) divided by the fund’s amortized cost value (generally
$1.00 per share) at the beginning of the period. If a fund holds a security and that security’s
credit quality declines, the security’s market price should also decline, boosting the security’s
market yield. But because funds use amortized cost accounting, the rise in the security’s yield
would not be immediately reflected in the fund’s yield. Generally speaking, only if that secu-
rity matures and the fund rolls over its holding of that security, would the fund’s yield then
rise to reflect the increased credit risk.
There are other potential issues with using a prime-to-government fund yield spread to
assess the credit risk of prime money market funds. One issue is that the interest on Treasury
securities is exempt from state and local taxes. Also, there is a unique demand for Treasury
securities, such as by banks to meet capital standards. In part because of this unique demand,
the Treasury market is generally the most liquid bond market, imparting a liquidity premium
to Treasuries. These effects reduce the yield of Treasuries relative to taxable money market
instruments, perhaps leading a prime-to-government fund yield spread to overstate the credit
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exposure of prime money market funds.
Consequently, it seems appropriate to consider alternative ways to assess the credit risk
of prime MMFs. CDS premiums provide one alternative. In theory, the spread between the
yield on a credit-risky security and a comparable risk-free security equals the CDS premium
for insuring against default on the credit-risky security (Hull and White, 2000). Thus, CDS
premiums can be used to estimate the credit risk in a pool of securities. Numerous recent
studies have sought either to assess the credit risk or capital adequacy of banks using CDS
premiums. For example, Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) treat the entire banking system as
a portfolio, the riskiness of which is based on the CDS premiums of individual banks. Other
studies have used 5-year CDS premiums to assess systemic risk in bank portfolios at a fixed
horizon, such as over the next quarter or the coming year (Avesani, Pascual, and Li, 2006;
Huang, Zhou, and Zhu, 2009).
Rosengren (2012) uses CDS premiums in an attempt to assess the credit risk of prime
money market funds. He matches CDS premiums issuer-by-issuer with the portfolio hold-
ings of prime MMFs. His results suggest that prime MMFs take on significant credit risk: he
indicates that 37 percent of the assets of prime money market funds have an associated CDS
premium of nearly 300 basis points (287 basis points on an asset-weighted basis).2 If correct,
that premium is large. A shortcoming of Rosengren’s approach, however, is that he measures
credit risk using 5-year CDS premiums. This is a concern because the term structure of CDS
premiums is generally upward sloping for high quality issuers (Agrawal and Bohn, 2006; Han
and Zhou, 2011).3 Thus, it should generally be less costly in terms of CDS premiums to insure
against default on a portfolio composed of short-dated, high quality securities. Money mar-
ket fund portfolios fit these characteristics. Under Rule 2a-7, MMFs must hold securities that
mature or can be redeemed with 397 days. In addition, MMFs’ weighted average life (WAL)
must be 120 days or less. In practice, many of prime funds maintain even lower WALs. For
example, the WAL of prime funds averaged 72 days in July 2012. Also, MMFs may only hold
2In Congressional testimony on potential reform of money market funds, Scharfstein (2012) cites Rosengren’s
2012 estimate as indicating that “a meaningful fraction of the securities in prime MMFs were issued by firms with
CDS spreads well in excess of those of the safest investment grade companies.”
3For example, on July 27, 2012, the 5-year CDS premium for insuring against the default on Boeing was 65.50,
whereas the premium for a 1-year CDS was 13.47 (both are annual costs). Thus, an investor could obtain $10,000,000
of default insurance for 1 year on Boeing at a cost of $13,470, using a 1-year CDS, or pay $65,500 for one year’s
insurance with a 5-year CDS. The 1-year CDS would expire after one year, however, leaving the purchaser of the
1-year CDS with roll-over risk.
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high quality securities. Under Rule 2a-7, virtually all (97 percent) of a money market fund’s
portfolio must be in securities having the highest short-term credit rating (i.e., A1/P1/F1) or,
if a credit rating is unavailable, in securities judged to be of minimal credit risk. Thus, Rosen-
gren’s use of 5-year CDS premiums likely overstates the credit risk of prime MMFs, but the
level of the overstatement is an empirical question.
Collins, Gallagher, Heinrichs, and Plantier (2013) seek to improve on Rosengren’s ap-
proach by matching money market funds’ holdings with maturity-appropriate CDS premi-
ums. For example, if a fund holds a Ford Motor medium term note that has a remaining
maturity of 6 months, that note is matched with a 6-month CDS quote for Ford Motor. Ag-
gregating (on an asset-weighted basis) across all of a fund’s holdings provides an estimate of
the CDS premium needed to insure the fund’s portfolio against any and all credit losses un-
der the assumption that the fund holds each security until it matures (or defaults). We call
this credit risk measure “expected loss-to-maturity” (ELM). Collins et al. (2013) find that the
expected-loss-to maturity on all prime money market funds averaged 27 basis points in 2011,
again suggesting that the credit risk of prime money market funds is small.
Expected loss-to-maturity has elements in common with Bank for International Settlement
(BIS) guidelines for assessing Incremental Risk Charge (IRC). Under Basel II, a bank may face
a capital surcharge (the IRC) on its “trading book,” those securities a bank intends to actively
trade and hold for less than one year. Under BIS guidelines, to determine the capital surcharge,
the bank models the credit risk in its trading book under three assumptions: (a) the horizon
for measuring credit risk (“credit horizon”) is one year; (b) the capital surcharge takes into
account a security’s “liquidity horizon,” which is the point at which the bank can dispose of
trading book securities (generally, the shorter the liquidity horizon, the lower is the IRC); (c)
the bank maintains a “constant-risk” trading book, periodically rebalancing its trading book
to maintain a constant level of credit quality (for example, if the credit rating of a trading book
security declines from AAA to AA, the bank is assumed to replace that security with a AAA-
rated security). Studies by regulators (Dunn, Gibson, Ikosi, Jones, Monet, and Sullivan, 2006)
indicate that the incremental risk charge is 30 percent lower for a hypothetical bank with a
liquidity horizon of 1-month compared to a bank with a liquidity horizon of 1 year. Given that
we are measuring the annual cost of insuring a fund’s portfolio against losses, ELM implicitly
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sets a fund’s “credit horizon” to one year. In addition, ELM implicitly sets a fund’s “liquidity
horizon” to the remaining maturity of its securities holding.4 Finally, ELM implicitly assumes
that a fund maintains a “constant risk portfolio” throughout the year. In effect, this means
that as a fund’s securities mature, it is assumed that the fund rolls the assets into identical
securities.
As noted, money market funds hold the bulk of their assets in very short-term securities,
typically those maturing in 3 months or less. But CDS premiums are generally not quoted at
maturities of less than 6 months. To deal with this, Collins et al. (2013) assume that the CDS
premium on a security with one month to maturity is one-fourth the 6-month CDS premium
for the same issuer. Collins et al. (2013) present some evidence from short-term credit spreads
that this one-fourth assumption is not implausible. Quotes for intervening maturities (say 2
months) are then interpolated from the 6-month quote and 1-month estimate. However, this
method does not acknowledge that the CDS market may be thinly traded for some issuers,
especially at the 6-month horizon.
This paper seeks to improve further on the credit risk measure of Collins et al. (2013) by
synthetically creating CDS premiums for short-dated securities using default probabilities col-
lected from the Risk Management Institute (RMI) of the National University of Singapore. RMI
generates forward-looking probabilities for about 50,000 worldwide issuers on a daily basis for
maturities of 1, 3, 6, 9, 12, 18, and 24 months ahead.5 RMI produces these default probabilities
using a reduced form model of issuer credit risk, which among other things, incorporates
the Merton (1974) distance-to-default concept, as well as firm-specific and macroeconomic
variables. Research (Chen, 2013) indicates that RMI’s default probabilities have a good track
record, especially for issuers in developed countries, at maturities of 6 months or less, which
is the horizon we are most concerned with in this paper. Given the RMI default probabilities,
4Our ELM concept is in some sense more conservative than the BIS guidelines under which banks compute
IRC. BIS guidelines allow banks to treat a security’s liquidity horizon as the date by which the bank can reasonably
expect to dispose of the security in the market with little price pressure. Thus, if a bank holds a 10-year corporate
bond and believes it could dispose of it in, say, 6 months with little or no price pressure, Basel II standards allow
the bank to treat the bond’s liquidity horizon as 6 months. Suppose, in contrast, that a money market fund holds a
medium term note with a remaining maturity of 6 months. Even if the money market fund could sell the note with
no price pressure within, say, 7 days, our ELM concept implicitly sets the note’s liquidity horizon to the remaining
maturity of 6 months.
5RMI uses the forward intensity model of Duan, Sun, and Wang (2012) to estimate firms’ default probabilities
for several periods into the future. Covariates include macroeconomic factors (e.g., trailing 1-year returns on the
S&P 500), a firm’s “distance-to-default” based on Merton (1974), as well as firm-specific capital structure, liquidity,
and volatility metrics.
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the estimated (synthetic) CDS premium for a given issuer and given remaining maturity is
the relevant default probability times the expected loss given default. We use standard CDS
market assumptions about expected loss given default. By interpolating, we are able to obtain
estimated CDS premiums for the vast majority of assets that money market funds hold. This,
in turn, allows us to calculate ELM for individual prime money market funds and for prime
money market funds as a group.
Investors, fund managers, and policymakers may, however, also be interested in the cost
of insuring against the likelihood that a money market fund might “break the dollar.” Under
Rule 2a-7, a money market fund may offer a per-share price of $1.00 only if its mark-to-market
value remains within 1/2 cent (50 basis points) of $1.00. If its mark-to-market value drops below
$.995, the fund must lower its per-share price to $.99. This is colloquially known as “breaking
the dollar.” Policymakers and other experts have expressed concerns that this could lead to
a run on money market funds.6 We assess the cost of insuring against such an event, which
we call BDI(l, u), for Break the Dollar Insurance. We allow for a insurance deductible l and a
maximum loss of u (u could be the entire value of the fund), where l and u are measured in
basis points of a fund’s assets.
As we discuss, BDI(l, u) is more difficult to calculate than ELM because defaults may be
correlated across issuers. For example, money market funds hold (U.S. dollar-denominated)
commercial paper and other short-term debt issued by large global banks. The failure of a
large global bank could threaten the solvency of other large banks if, for instance, surviving
banks hold debt issued by the failing bank. To correctly assess the probability that a fund might
break the dollar, default correlations need to be taken into account. We do this using a copula
(Li, 2000) implemented by Monte Carlo simulation. Our approach has much in common with
measures of systemic risk and stress indicators for banks (Tarashev and Zhu, 2008; Huang
et al., 2009; Segoviano and Goodhart, 2009).
To undertake the analysis, we create a new dataset comprising the entire record of the port-
folio holdings of each prime money market fund over the period January 2011 to December
2012. We obtain funds’ portfolio holdings from SEC form N-MFP. This form, which all money
market funds have been required to report since November 2010, collects monthly data on a
6See, for example, FSOC (2012) and Squam Lake (2011, 2013).
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fund’s entire list of portfolio securities. By hand, we match the month-end portfolio holdings
of prime money market funds issuer-by-issuer and maturity-by-maturity with default proba-
bilities obtained from RMI (Section 3 provides details). We are able to match roughly 90 percent
of the assets of prime money market funds with estimated (synthetic) CDS premiums.
Our results indicate that there is generally limited credit risk-to-maturity in prime money
market funds. Over the 24 months between January 2011 and December 2012, prime money
market funds had an (asset-weighted) average ELM of 15 basis points. The credit risk exposure
of prime funds did evolve over this period. Credit exposure was lower (11 basis points) in early
2011. It rose somewhat in the fall of 2011 to a maximum (on an asset-weighted average basis)
of 22 basis points in November and December 2011.7 Thereafter, average credit risk receded to
just 9 basis points at the end of 2012.
Regulators, press reports and some academic studies (Chernenko and Sunderam, 2014)
have included claims that the credit risk of prime MMFs increased in March-August of 2011
because these funds held, or even increased their holdings of, securities issued by eurozone
banks in order to boost fund yields. Our results present a rather different picture. We find
that MMF holdings of eurozone or other European banks did not contribute importantly to the
modest increase in the average credit risk (as measured by ELM) of prime MMFs in the second
half of 2011. Instead, the rise was primarily due to an increased contribution from prime fund
holdings of banks domiciled in the Asia-Pacific region. As credit conditions deteriorated for
eurozone banks in the fall of 2011, MMFs drastically reduced their holdings of eurozone bank
debt and shortened the maturities of their remaining eurozone holdings. This offset to a great
extent an increase in the credit risk of holding eurozone banks. At the same time, prime funds
increased their holdings of bank debt in Canada, Norway, Australia/New Zealand, and Japan.
In the fall of 2011, however, as the eurozone situation continued to worsen, CDS spreads rose
across the world, in particular in the Asia/Pacific region. Some of this likely reflected concerns
that the failure of a large eurozone bank would reverberate across the world financial system.
More generally, slowing global economic growth might also have lowered the credit quality
of banks in the Asia/Pacific region and other export-driven economies. The timing of the rise
in CDS spreads also suggests that S&P’s August 5th downgrade of the U.S. credit rating in-
7The maximum credit risk in any individual prime MMF was 47 basis points in December 2011.
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fluenced perceptions. Finally, the credit quality of Japanese banks might have suffered from
the lingering impact of the March 2011 tsunami and the ongoing nuclear crisis. This growth in
global credit risk, combined with the increased holdings of money market funds in these pre-
sumably safer regions of the world, largely explains why prime MMFs experienced a modest
rise in measured credit risk in the second half of 2011. Given that eurozone developments only
indirectly affected banks in the Asia/Pacific region, we conclude that the mild increase in the
credit risk of prime money market funds in the second half of 2011 reflected contagion in the
worldwide banking system, not actions taken by money market funds.
The cost of break-the-dollar insurance BDI(l, u) should be less than ELM for two reasons.
First, break-the-dollar insurance would kick in only if a fund actually breaks the dollar, in
other words if its mark-to-market value drops below $.995 per share. Second, like conventional
insurance policies, break-the-dollar insurance can be structured to have a deductible l and a
maximum coverage amount u. The deductible and maximum coverage limit the insurance
provider’s exposure and thus the cost of purchasing the insurance. As we show, BDI(l, u)
is indeed less than ELM. We estimate that for plausible values of l and u, the cost of break-
the-dollar insurance over the period January 2011 to December 2012 averaged 7 basis to 9 basis
points (weighted by assets), roughly half the 15 basis point average cost (as measured by ELM)
of insuring a fund against all expected losses over the 24-month period. Interestingly, this
break-the-dollar insurance estimate is similar to the range of fees the U.S. Treasury assessed
under its 2008-2009 temporary guarantee program.
Finally, using fund-by-fund values of ELM, we examine whether the SEC’s 2010 reforms
reduced the credit risk of money market funds. Using a panel data regression, we find that
ELM declines as a fund’s liquidity rises and its WAL declines. This suggests that the SEC’s
decision to impose a minimum liquidity standard and a maximum WAL on MMFs in January
2010 reduced the credit risk of prime funds. It is difficult to gauge how sizable the effect
was because funds did not report their monthly portfolio holdings, WALs, or weekly liquidity
(according to the SEC definition of weekly liquidity) before November 2010. However, using
plausible assumptions about the levels of weekly liquidity and fund WALs before 2010, we
show that these two new provisions had the potential to substantially lower a fund’s credit
risk.
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2 Methodology
This section describes our approach to estimating the credit risk of prime money market funds.
For exposition, we introduce the following notation:
I = total number of issuers in a fund’s portfolio
J = total number of securities in a fund’s portfolio
Tj = remaining days to maturity on security j
Di = remaining days to a default by issuer i
wij = proportion of a fund’s assets invested in security j issued by issuer i
Ri = recovery rate on an issuer i’s securities in the event of a default
CDSi(Tj) = expected loss (annual rate) on security j issued by i with remaining life Tj
pi(Tj) = cumulative probability up to time Tj that issuer i defaults; i.e., P(Di < Tj)
p˜i(Tj) = 1−
[
1− pi(Tj)
] 360/Tj , the annualized counterpart of pi(Tj)
Y
Tj
i = equal to 1 if Di < Tj and zero otherwise
Define expected loss-to-maturity (ELM) for a given fund at a given moment in time to be:
ELM =
I
∑
i=1
J
∑
j=1
wijCDSi(Tj) (1)
As noted, CDS premiums are not generally quoted for maturities of fewer than 6 months. To
make Equation (1) operational, we use default probabilities provided by RMI. As the next
section discusses, RMI creates forward-looking default probabilities for about 50,000 issuers
worldwide for maturities of 1, 3, 6, 9, 12, 18, and 24 months. We interpolate these to obtain
pi(Tj) for any intervening maturity.
Given the RMI default probabilities (or interpolated values), we approximate the annual-
ized CDS premium for insuring against credit losses on issuer i as:
ˆCDSi(Tj) = (1− Ri) p˜i(Tj) = (1− Ri)
{
1− [1− pi(Tj))]360/Tj} (2)
Substituting Equation (2) into Equation (1) gives:
ELM =
I
∑
i=1
J
∑
j=1
wij(1− Ri) p˜i(Tj) (3)
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ELM approximates the expected loss on a fund’s portfolio. In theory, the expected loss,
or CDSi(Tj), on a given issuer should equal the difference between the yield on that issuer’s
debt, ri(Tj), and the yield on a risk-free security of comparable maturity, rg(Tj), (Hull and
White, 2000). Thus, it should be that:
ELM =
I
∑
i=1
J
∑
j=1
wij
[
ri(Tj)− rg(Tj)
]
=
(
r¯− r¯g
)
(4)
where r¯ is the fund’s gross yield and r¯g is the gross yield of a portfolio of risk-free securities
with maturities that are identical to the corresponding risky securities in the fund’s portfolio.
If Equation (4) holds, it indicates that the gross yield advantage of a prime fund over a com-
parable government money market fund measures a prime fund’s credit risk. As is discussed
in the introduction, however, a fund’s reported yield is based on the amortized cost of its se-
curities, rather than mark-to-market values. Consequently, ELM is likely to be more variable
than (r¯ − r¯g) and the two measures could diverge from month-to-month. Later, we evaluate
the divergence between ELM and (r¯ − r¯g) and find that it is, on average, small across prime
funds.
ELM measures the annual cost of insuring a fund’s portfolio against any credit losses,
however large or small, assuming defaults are independent events. It also may be useful to
measure the cost of insuring against a fund “breaking the dollar.” As noted earlier, a fund is
said to break the dollar if its mark-to-market value falls below $.995. Under the assumption
that the fund maintains a “constant risk” portfolio, the cost of insuring against this event de-
pends on expected losses as well as any first-loss (deductible) provision and the maximum
amount of the coverage. For example, one could envision designing a “break-the-dollar” in-
surance policy with a 50-basis-point deductible and a cap on total losses incurred by the in-
surer of 300 basis points.8 Define any first-loss provision as l and the insurer’s cap as u. Then,
break-the-dollar (BDI) insurance is:
BDI(l, u) = E {min [max (Loss− l, 0) , u]} (5)
8For example, given defaults amounting to 300 basis points, the fund would be responsible for 50 basis points
and the insurer would be responsible for 250 basis points. For defaults amounting to more than 350 basis points,
the fund receives 300 basis points from the insurer but incurs the 50 basis point deductible plus any losses greater
than 350 basis points.
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where Loss =
[
∑Ii=1 ∑
J
j=1 wij(1− Ri)Y
Tj
i
]
, P
(
Y
Tj
i = 1
)
= p˜i(Tj), (1− Ri) is the loss rate if is-
suer i defaults, l = 50 basis points, u =300 basis points, and E{•} is the expectations operator.
This is the annualized cost of providing “break the dollar” insurance (BDI) against a “constant
risk” money market fund portfolio.
Calculating ELM is straightforward, requiring only multiplication and addition. If de-
faults were independent events, calculating BDI(l, u) would also be straightforward. Things
are more challenging when we assume defaults are correlated across issuers. In that case,
calculating BDI(l, u) requires computation of an I-dimensional integral (where I ≤ J) repre-
senting the joint probability that there are I defaults in the fund’s portfolio over a given pe-
riod. This is a well-known problem in the banking literature on calculating value-at-risk (VaR)
and required regulatory capital such as IRC. That literature generally assumes that defaults of
banks and other financial institutions are correlated. Many of the securities that money market
funds hold are issued by banks or other financial intermediaries. Thus, we assume defaults
are correlated across issuers.
The challenge of calculating expected losses like Equation (5) when defaults are correlated
is often solved by Monte Carlo. We calculate Equation (5) using a copula approach (Li, 2000)
implemented by Monte Carlo. Appendix 1 provides details. Briefly, the approach involves
simulating random default times for each issuer i a large number of times (m=1 to M trials)
for each month in the sample. Default probabilities, and hence the random default times,
are correlated across issuers with correlations calibrated to historical movements in default
probabilities from January 2011 to December 2012. If a given simulation indicates that issuer i
defaults before time Tj, a fund experiences a loss equal to the sum of wij(1− Ri) . Losses across
all of a fund’s securities are accumulated during a particular simulation m. If a fund’s losses in
simulation m accumulate to more than 50 basis points of the fund’s assets, the fund is counted
as having broken the dollar (i.e., Loss > l).
Brute force Monte Carlo calculates Equation (5) by sampling Bernoulli random variates
Y
Tj
i with a probability of success (“success” meaning default) of p˜i(Tj), where p˜i(Tj) are cor-
related across issuers. This, however, may require very large numbers of simulated random
draws because credit defaults are “rare events” (Glasserman and Li, 2005). Consequently, re-
searchers often use variance reduction techniques such as importance sampling (Rubenstein
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and Kroese, 2007) to improve simulation accuracy. We reduce variance by “reusing” simulated
random variates. For example, instead of sampling 24× 50, 000× number o f f unds Bernoulli
random variates Y
Tj
i , we draw one sample of 50,000 Bernoulli variates and use these in trial m
to calculate BDI(l, u) for each of the 24 different months and for each fund in our sample. This
appears to be sufficient to reduce variance because the standard errors of BDI(l, u) are small,
generally in the range of 1 basis point or less.
3 Data
To undertake the analysis, we create a new dataset comprising a complete record of the in-
dividual holdings of prime money market funds over the period January 2011 to December
2012. The analysis seeks to match those individual holdings on an issuer-by-issuer basis with
estimated credit default swap premiums (via Equation 2) for the same issuer.
We obtain the complete record of the portfolio holdings of all prime money market funds
from the SEC’s form N-MFP. We categorize these holdings by the parent of the issuer. For
example, Honda Auto Receivables Owner Trust, which issues commercial paper in the U.S. to
help finance auto loans to U.S. residents, is affiliated with Honda Motor Company Ltd. which
we take to be its “parent.”
Parent companies are often global firms that may for any number of reasons need dollar
funding from money market funds and other financial market participants. For instance, prime
money market funds lend dollars on a short-term basis to large global banks (including those
with headquarters in Europe, Japan, Australia and elsewhere) to make loans to subsidiaries of
foreign companies that do business in the United States, to make consumer or car loans to U.S.
residents, or to invest in U.S. Treasury and agency securities. Eurozone banks may also borrow
dollars to make dollar loans to subsidiaries of U.S. companies that do business in Europe.
Unlike U.S. banks, large foreign banks do not have significant retail U.S. dollar deposits to fund
their global dollar-based operations and thus may seek to borrow dollars elsewhere, such as
from money market funds or other institutional investors. Some global banks, including some
domiciled in Europe, Asia, Canada, and the U.K. are “primary dealers,” which are banks that
are approved as trading counterparties of the New York Federal Reserve Bank; these banks
engage in repurchase agreements, including with money market funds. We assign each parent
13
firm to a particular region of the world based on the parent firm’s headquarters. For example,
BNP Paribas SA is headquartered in France and thus assigned a region of “Europe.” Similarly,
JPMorgan Chase & Co, although having worldwide operations, is assigned a region of “U.S.”
In measuring a fund’s credit risk, we use the final legal maturity date (e.g., 271 days) as
reported to the SEC in form N-MFP.9 The final legal maturity includes any “demand feature”
a security may have, which allows a fund to demand its return of capital within a prespecified
number of days.
Figure 2 provides summary statistics on the holdings of prime money market funds. As
can be seen, prime money market funds invest in a range of money market instruments in-
cluding commercial paper, bank CDs, Eurodollar deposits, medium term- and floating-rate
notes, Treasury and agency securities, and repurchase agreements. In January 2011, commer-
cial paper constituted 30.8 percent of prime fund assets (30.8 percent), bank CDs 25.5 percent,
Treasury and agency securities 13.4 percent, repurchase agreements 16.1 percent, and other
securities 4.1 percent.
Figure 3 tabulates these holdings by the issuer’s region of the world, either Americas, Eu-
rope, Asia/Pacific, or Other. In January 2011, one-third (35.7 percent) of prime funds’ assets
were invested in issuers headquartered in the Americas, mostly in the United States; about
8 percent of funds’ assets were invested in Canadian issuers (primarily banks). A bit more
than 50 percent of prime funds assets were attributable to issuers domiciled in Europe, the
bulk of which was invested in issuers domiciled in three countries (France, 14.9 percent; U.K.,
11 percent, and Germany, 8.3 percent). Another 12.2 percent of prime fund assets were in-
vested in issuers domiciled in the Asia/Pacific region, split about evenly between Japan and
Australia/New Zealand.
From RMI, we obtain month-end cumulative default probabilities for maturities of 1, 3, 6,
9, 12, 18, and 24 months for as many issuers as possible in our sample. To calculate ELM and
BDI(l, u) we need default probabilities that match the remaining maturity of each security a
fund holds. Without some assumptions, we would be unable to match most of the securities
9This is in contrast to the security’s maturity date, which a fund may use to determine its weighted average
maturity (WAM). Consider, for example, a floating rate note that matures in 271 days but whose yield resets weekly.
Consistent with the security’s weekly interest rate reset, the fund may use a maturity of 7 days in calculating its
WAM. But the fund must use the legal maturity date of 271 days in calculating the fund’s weighted average life
(WAL).
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that prime funds hold with RMI-supplied default probabilities (e.g., for a security with a re-
maining maturity of 67 days). We deal with this by linearly interpolating default probabilities
for every day between the maturities that RMI provides. Because some of the securities that
prime funds hold mature within 1 to 7 days (e.g., overnight repurchase agreements), we also
need estimates of default probabilities for maturities of less than 1 month. We solve this prob-
lem by imposing the condition that for any random variable x whose support is in the range
[0,∞), if x has a continuous cumulative probability distribution, then P[x ≤ 0] = 0. This con-
dition implies that p˜i(Tj = 0) = 0, allowing us to linearly interpolate between that value and
p˜i(Tj) = 30/360).
Next, we match cumulative default probabilities (either actual or interpolated values) by
hand with the list of parent firms collected from the holdings of money market funds as re-
ported in the N-MFP reports. We are able to match default probabilities with parent firms for
over 90 percent of the assets of prime money market funds. To calculate ELM and BDI(l, u)
we also need recovery rates Ri for each issuer. Consistent with market practice, we use a re-
covery rate of .40 for all private sector issuers except Japanese banks. For Japanese banks, we
follow market convention and use a recovery rate of .35.10 Our analysis could be extended
by randomizing recovery rates. However, evidence in Tarashev and Zhu (2008) suggests that
the added complexity may not add much additional insight in terms of results; they indicate,
based on data collected from Markit for 136 entities, that the recovery rate market participants
expect varies in a narrow range around 40 percent for daily data from late 2003 to early 2005.
Consequently, we simply fix our recovery rates at either .35 or .4 depending on the parent
company.
Our analysis could overstate ELM and BDI(l, u) because we use a number of simplifying
assumptions. The fixed income securities prime funds hold sometimes have credit enhance-
ments, such as a guarantee, letter of credit, or other provision that guarantees return of princi-
pal and interest. Although such enhancements reduce the risk of holding a security, we do not
take them into account except in cases where the guarantee is provided by the U.S. govern-
ment or other sovereign nation. Second, money market funds sometimes hold asset-backed
10For example, on its CDSW page, Bloomberg uses a recovery rate of .4 to estimate implied default probabilities
for private sector issuers from CDS premiums. The only exception appears to be that Bloomberg uses a recovery
rate of .35 for Japanese banks.
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securities. All else equal, asset-backed securities have less credit risk than securities that are
not asset-backed. For example, recovery rates on asset-backed securities that defaulted during
the 2007-2008 crisis are generally reported to have been much higher (in the range of 80 percent
or more) compared with a recovery rate of about 40 percent on unsecured Lehman Brothers
debt. We ignore this fact and simply treat asset-backed securities as senior unsecured debt.
Third, repurchase agreements are more than fully collateralized by securities that a fund’s
repo counterparty (the borrower) must place with a third-party custodian. The fund may seize
this collateral if the repo counterparty fails to unwind the repo (i.e., fails to return the fund’s
cash) when the repo expires. All else equal, this makes repurchase agreements less risky than
other senior unsecured debt. Nevertheless, we ignore this, treating repurchase agreements as
uncollateralized (i.e., the credit risk is the full credit risk of the repo counterparty) unless the
repos are fully collateralized by Treasury and agency securities, in which case we treat repos
as having the default risk of the U.S. government.11 Fourth, some of the roughly 10 percent
of assets that we cannot match with default probabilities are securities issued by non-financial
companies. Generally speaking, when available, CDS premiums on non-financial corporations
have tended to be lower than those on financial companies.12
On the other hand, our analysis could understate ELM and BDI(l, u) because of how we
treat sovereign debt. RMI does not publish default probabilities for sovereigns. Consequently,
we simply assume that the default probabilities for U.S. Treasury and agency securities are zero
at all maturities. We doubt many readers would object to this treatment for Treasury securities.
With respect to agency securities, we note that over our sample short-term agency securities
have yielded only a few basis points more than Treasury securities, indicating that market par-
ticipants view short-term agency debt as about as risky as Treasury debt, consistent with the
federal government’s takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in September 2008. Neverthe-
less, market participants do not necessarily view Treasury and agency securities as risk free.
11For a money market fund, there may be liquidity risk (which is not the subject of this paper) in a repurchase
agreement backed by Treasury and agency collateral but there is arguably no credit risk (which is the subject of this
paper). If a fund’s repo counterparty fails to return the fund’s cash when the repo matures, the fund would seize
the Treasury and agency collateral pledged by the repo counterparty. A fund might need to liquidate some of the
Treasury and agency collateral to meet shareholder redemptions, but that is case of liquidity risk, not credit risk.
Put differently, we assume that if the fund were to hold the Treasury and agency collateral to maturity, it would all
mature at par.
12For example, on January 31, 2011, then 1-year CDS premium on Pepsi Co, Inc. was quoted at 11 basis points,
compared to 50 basis points for BNP Paribas SA, a large European bank.
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For example, CDS premiums on Treasury securities are low but not zero (The Economist, 2011).
It is unclear whether this arises because the CDS market for Treasury securities is thin (Austin
and Miller, 2011) or because market participants now view Treasury securities as having some,
albeit still very small, default risk. If it is the latter, our analysis might understate ELM and
BDI(l, u) by some, presumably small, margin.13
4 Industry Average Results
Figure 4 plots the asset-weighted average across all prime funds of expected loss-to-maturity
(ELM) for the period January 2011 to December 2012. For comparison, the figure also plots
the prime-to-government fund yield spread shown in Figure 1.
ELM is more volatile than the prime-to-government yield spread, consistent with the fact
that funds report yields that are based on amortized cost rather than mark-to-market values.
In some months, the two measures diverge by as much as 7 basis points, primarily because
of month-to-month variation in ELM. Nevertheless, ELM and the prime-to-government yield
spread track each reasonably well, rising and falling more or less in tandem. On average, the
two measures differ little (1 basis point) from each other over the 24-month period. Given that
the credit risk measures track each other, for purposes of assessing fund credit risk, regulators
and investors might prefer the prime-to-government yield spread as simpler, more readily
available alternative to measures such as ELM or credit risk measures constructed from CDS
quotes (e.g., Rosengren, 2012). The paper examines that possibility in more detail later.
Figure 4 suggests that the aggregate credit risk of prime funds is low. ELM averaged just
15 basis points on an asset-weighted basis from January 2011 to December 2012. This low
level is consistent with these facts: (a) money market funds hold very short-term securities;
(b) these securities are investment grade and virtually all are of the highest short-term credit
rating; (c) the term structure of credit default swap spreads is upward sloping. Together, these
13The SEC’s N-MFP data indicate that money market funds hold very little, if any, sovereign debt of other coun-
tries. This reflects the fact that money market funds may only hold U.S. dollar denominated securities in combina-
tion with an apparent lack of issuance by non-U.S. sovereigns of money market instruments denominated in U.S.
dollars. In our N-MFP data, a very small number of securities are linked to a sovereigns other than the U.S. federal
government. These limited cases arise: (a) because a sovereign has guaranteed the money market instrument of
a private or quasi-private sector issuer; (b) a sovereign has taken over the liabilities of a private sector company.
Virtually all of these cases arise from Germany, France, Belgium, Norway, or Japan. We assume that the default
probabilities of these securities are zero.
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characteristics limit the credit risk of prime money market funds. These estimates also sug-
gest that Collins et al. (2013) overstated the credit risk of prime money market funds. Collins
et al. (2013) estimated that ELM averaged (on an asset-weighted basis) 27 basis points over
2011. Here, using a better approach to estimate default probabilities at maturities of less than 6
months, we find that ELM averaged (on an asset-weighted basis) about half that, just 15 basis
points over 2011.
ELM, though remaining low over the 24-month period, does vary. It changed little in the
first half of 2011, ranging only between 10 and 12 basis points. It varied more in the second half
of 2011, rising from 11 basis points in June 2011 to a maximum of 21 basis points in November.
That rise is consistent with the market’s intensifying concerns about eurozone banks, a dete-
riorating outlook for the U.S. economy, and the looming U.S. federal government debt ceiling
crisis (see Collins et al., 2013). Still, the rise was small compared to the increases in 5-year
CDS premiums on European financial institutions and large U.S. banks over the same period
(Figure 1). By February 2012, ELM had receded to 13 basis points, little different from its level
in July 2011. ELM fell, on average, over the remainder of 2012, likely reflecting the challenges
of eurozone policy makers to find an all-encompassing economic and political solution to the
eurozone’s problems and the risks that the lack of a solution posed for global financial markets.
Prime fund managers acted vigorously in the second half of 2011 to reduce their expo-
sure to the eurozone crisis. Prime funds also sharply reduced their holdings of issuers whose
parents were domiciled in Europe (Figure 5). From May to December 2011, prime MMFs re-
duced holdings of French-domiciled issuers by 75 percent (from 15.1 percent to 3.3 percent of
portfolio holdings), with the bulk of the decline occurring from June to September. As prime
funds pulled back from the eurozone, they reallocated their investments to regions presumably
more insulated from the eurozone crisis, including the U.S., Canada, certain Northern Euro-
pean countries, and, most notably, the Asia/Pacific region. Prime funds’ assets attributable to
Asia/Pacific-domiciled issuers rose from 11.6 percent in June 2011 to 17.5 percent by December
2011, an increase of $71 billion. This increase went primarily to banks headquartered in Japan
and Australia/New Zealand.
In addition, prime funds mitigated credit risks from European issuers by lowering the
WAL of their remaining holdings in European-domiciled issuers. As Figure 6 shows, the WAL
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for prime funds’ European holdings fell from 63 days in May 2011 to 30 days in December 2011.
Prime funds achieved this, in part, by raising the proportion of their remaining eurozone hold-
ings devoted to overnight or 7-day repurchase agreements, most of which were collateralized
by U.S. Treasury and agency securities.
These steps were effective in helping to insulate prime funds from the eurozone crisis. As
evidence, Figure 7 shows results of a counterfactual comparing ELM to the ELM that would
have occurred had prime funds continued throughout the remainder of 2011 to hold the portfo-
lios they held in May 2011 (in other words, had they not taken steps to insulate their portfolios
from the eurozone crisis). As seen in the upper-left panel, ELM would have been modestly
higher (a peak difference of 4 basis points by November 2011) had prime funds continued to
hold their May-level portfolio allocations throughout the rest of 2011.
The actions prime funds took to insulate themselves from the eurozone crisis would have
been more effective had concerns about eurozone banks not spilled over into the global bank-
ing system. The remaining panels in Figure 7 show the contribution by region (either North
America, Europe, or Asia/Pacific) to the ELM measure in the upper-left panel. Throughout
2011, the contribution from North America remained low and stable, in part reflecting the
fact that much of prime funds’ exposure to North America includes holdings of Treasury and
agency securities. The lower-left panel shows the contribution of Europe to ELM. The solid
black line shows that the actual contribution from Europe rose only slightly (3 basis points)
from May to December 2011, consistent with prime funds’ actions to limit exposure to eu-
rozone issuers. Moreover, the counterfactual ELM—the red dashed line in the that panel—
indicates that the contribution from Europe would have risen substantially (11 basis points
rather than 3) had funds not acted to limit their exposure to the eurozone. Thus, most of the rise
in ELM from June to December 2011 reflected contributions from countries outside Europe,
notably those in the Asia/Pacific region. As the lower-right panel indicates, the Asia/Pacific
region contributed more to the credit exposure of prime funds in the second half of 2011.
Thus, the steps prime funds took to insulate themselves from the eurozone crisis were
offset to an extent by the exposure of prime funds to issuers domiciled in the Asia/Pacific
region.14 This, in turn, appears to reflect that prime funds were, to some extent, passive recip-
14This result is even more pronounced when we examine only those funds with ELM in the top quartile as of
May 31, 2011. For this group of funds carrying higher credit risk in May, asset-weighted average ELM peaked in
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ients of contagion from eurozone banks to the global banking system. Figure 8 plots the index
of 5-year CDS premiums for large European financial institutions (i.e., the Markit iTraxx senior
financial index). The figure also plots the averages of 5-year CDS premiums for selected large
Japanese and Australian banks. The CDS premiums on Japanese and Australian banks are al-
most always lower than the European CDS index. Thus, all else equal, by shifting their portfo-
lios toward banks in Japan and Australia, prime money market funds expected to reduce risk.
But, as shown here, the three series are correlated. Notably, the 5-year CDS premiums for the
Japanese and Australian banks rose from low levels (100 basis points or less) in January 2011
to over 250 basis points on October 4, the same day the 5-year CDS index for European finan-
cials hit its highest level (296 basis points) to that point in 2011. CDS premiums on Japanese
banks, and to a lesser extent on Australian banks, spiked again in late November when the
CDS index on European financials hit its highest point ever (355 basis points). This corre-
lation is not perfect, however. For example, in mid-September, CDS premiums on Japanese
and Australian banks fell somewhat while those on European banks continued to climb, indi-
cating that non-eurozone factors also influenced the perceived credit quality of Japanese and
Australian banks. Notably, the August 5th downgrade of the S&P’s U.S. credit rating likely
reverberated internationally. Furthermore, export-driven Japanese and Australian economies
are particularly vulnerable to slowing global economic growth. Finally, the lingering effects
of the tsunami and the resulting nuclear disaster may also stoked anxieties about the health
of Japanese banks. The spike in CDS premiums among banks headquartered in Japan and
Australia thus boosted the credit risk of prime funds in the fall of 2011.
These factors, not eurozone developments, appear to be the primary reasons the credit
risks of prime money market funds rose somewhat in the second half of 2011. We conclude that
the increase in the credit risk of prime money market funds in the second half of 2011 reflected
worsening global economic conditions and contagion in the worldwide banking system, rather
than actions taken by money market funds.
December at 29 basis points. These funds’ European holdings contributed 7 basis points to their asset-weighted
average ELM in May. This contribution rose to 11 basis points in December 2011 – well below the counterfactual
contribution of their European holdings, which would have amounted to 21 basis points in December had funds
not reacted. Similarly, the contribution from the Asia/Pacific region was 15 basis points in December, compared to
9 basis points had these funds continued to hold their May-level portfolio allocations throughout the rest of 2011.
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4.1 Breaking the Dollar: Insurance Cost
This section presents estimates of BDI(l, u). As noted earlier, this is the cost of insuring a fund
against defaults when losses total more than 50 basis points of a fund’s assets. We estimate
BDI(l, u) using a t-density copula, which we simulate by Monte Carlo using 50,000 random
draws per month (see Appendix 1), with 5 degrees of freedom (d f = 5).15
We present two different sets of BDI(l, u). We set l = 0 or l = 50 basis points of fund
assets. Setting l = 0 implies that the insurance has no deductible. Setting l = 50 implies that
there is a 50-basis-point deductible, which could be assumed either by the fund’s adviser or
by fund shareholders. In both cases, we set u = 300 basis points. Under this assumption, the
maximum insurable loss, after the 50-basis-point deductible is incurred, would be 300 basis
points of fund assets. If a fund’s losses from defaults totaled more than 350 basis points, the
insurance would pay out, and the fund would close. Any losses greater than 350 basis points
would accrue to fund investors.
We selected these choices for l and u, in part, because they are roughly in line with the
parameters of the U.S. Treasury’s 2008-2009 guarantee program for money market funds. Un-
der that program, the Treasury temporarily provided break-the-dollar insurance for money
market funds. The insurance kicked in if a fund’s market-to-market price per share fell below
$.995, in other words, if the fund broke the dollar. If a fund broke the dollar and used the Trea-
sury’s insurance, the fund was required to close and liquidate. Consequently, Treasury’s losses
would have been limited to the difference between a fund’s $1.00 NAV and the market value
of the fund’s assets. The Treasury’s program was backed by, and limited to, balances in the
Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF). When the Treasury introduced the money mar-
ket fund guarantee program in September 2008, the balance in the ESF was about $50 billion,
which implies that the Treasury’s potential exposure was limited to about 3 percent of the total
assets of prime money market funds.16 In addition, some regulators and academics argue for
15Rather than try to estimate the relevant degrees of freedom d f in the t-copula, following Hull and White (2004),
we simply set d f = 5. Experiments with d f = 1 and d f = 10 indicate marginal differences from those based on
d f = 5.
16It has occasionally been suggested that the Treasury Department guaranteed trillions of dollars in money mar-
ket fund assets (e.g., Bair, 2013). The Treasury’s exposure, however, was limited to the roughly $50 billion available
to it through the ESF. Also, the Treasury guarantee only applied to, at most, the assets in funds as of September 19,
2008. On that date, prime money market funds had assets of $1,728 billion, according to iMoneyNet.com. Thus,
the total exposure of the Treasury Department was limited to 289 basis points of prime fund assets, based on the
calculation 10,000 ×$50 billion/$1,728 billion.
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requiring money market fund advisers to commit capital to support losses their money market
funds might experience. Regulators in Europe argue for a capital buffer of 300 basis points of
fund assets. Some academics (Squam Lake, 2013; Hanson, Scharfstein, and Sunderam, 2013)
have suggested that U.S. fund advisers be required to hold a capital buffer in the range of 3 to
4 percent of risk-weighted assets. On the basis of these considerations, we set u = 300 basis
points.
The Treasury’s guarantee program did not impose an explicit deductible, which, on one
hand, suggests setting l = 0. On the other hand, the guarantee program required a fund using
the Treasury insurance to demand payment on any capital support agreement provided by the
fund’s adviser. For various reasons, fund advisers sometimes voluntarily entered into capital
support agreements with their money market funds. In such an arrangement, the adviser
would typically agree to buy, guarantee to buy, or provide insurance on the value of, one or
more fund securities at par value. In effect, this would provide a deductible to the Treasury on
its insurance. It is unclear how much this deductible would have been worth to the Treasury
Department because no money market fund ever drew on the Treasury’s insurance program.
Consequently, we rather arbitrarily set l = 0 or l = 50 basis points. As will be seen, results are
similar under either assumption.
Figure 9 presents estimates of BDI(0, 300) and BDI(50, 300). As would be expected, these
are lower than ELM. For example, in November 2011, ELM hit a peak of 21 basis points com-
pared to peak levels of 12 and 11 basis points for BDI(0, 300) and BDI(50, 300). Over the 24
months, BDI(0, 300) and BDI(50, 300) averaged 9 and 7 basis points, compared to 15 basis
points for ELM.
Interestingly, the estimates for BDI(0, 300) and BDI(50, 300) are about in the range of fees
the U.S. Treasury assessed under its 2008-2009 temporary guarantee program. The Treasury
Department initially set the cost to funds for this insurance at 4 basis points at an annual rate
for funds with a mark-to-market value of $.9975 or above and 6 basis points for funds with a
mark-to-market value of less than $.9975 but greater than $.9950 (insurance was not available
to money market funds with a mark-to-market value of less than $0.9950).17 The Treasury
raised the cost to 6 to 8.8 basis points at an annual rate (again depending on whether a fund’s
17See U.S. Treasury Department, “Treasury Announces Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market
Funds,” September 29, 2008.
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mark-to-market was above or below $.9975) when it first renewed the insurance program,
about in line with our estimates of 9 and 7 basis points for BDI(0, 300) and BDI(50, 300) over
the period 2011-2012.
5 Individual Fund Results
Until now, we have focused primarily on asset-weighted averages of ELM and BDI(l, u). As
Figure 10 indicates, though, averages can could mask interesting details, notably that there is
considerable variation in ELM and yield spread across funds. This is worth exploring. This
section uses panel data regressions in an effort to better understand why these cross-sectional
differences arise.18
5.1 Is Yield Spread a Good Measure of Credit Risk?
As noted earlier, Hull and White (2000) argue that arbitrage ensures that the CDS premium on
a bond should, under “ideal” conditions, equal the spread between a risky bond’s yield and
the yield on a risk-free bond with an identical maturity. If this condition approximately holds
for a fund across its entire portfolio, rather than constructing a credit risk measure from CDS
premiums as we have done in this paper, regulators and investors can simply look to a fund’s
yield spread (r¯ − r¯g), which can readily be determined from data published by third-party
providers such as iMoneyNet.com and Crane data.
As Hull and White (2000) point out, however, there are reasons why the difference between
the CDS premium on a bond might not equal the difference between the yield on a risky bond
and the risk free rate. One is that the arbitrage condition assumes identical tax treatment
for risk-free (i.e., Treasury) and private sector bonds, which is generally not the case. The
arbitrage condition also assumes that the recovery rate used to calculate the CDS premium is
the same recovery rate the market is using, which might not be true. The Hull-White arbitrage
condition also assumes that the yield curve is flat, which is generally not the case during our
18Unlike as in the previous section, where results were asset-weighted, in this section small funds are given the
same weight as very large funds. Therefore, to ensure that panel data results are not skewed by a number of small
funds for which we were unable to match the majority of portfolio securities to default probabilities, we further
clean the dataset used in this section. In any given month, we remove funds for which less than 70 percent of fund
assets could be matched to default probabilities. The total assets of these omitted funds amount to 10 percent of
industry assets.
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sample period. Any of these conditions may not hold in our setup, meaning that ELM might
not equal the fund’s yield spread (r¯− r¯g).
There are other reasons (r¯ − r¯g) might differ from ELM. These stem from our particular
data set. In theory, to construct (r¯− r¯g), we should match each of a fund’s portfolio securities to
a government security with an identical maturity. This is cumbersome and, more importantly,
is not a measure readily at hand to investors or regulators who wish to gauge a fund’s credit
risk. Consequently, we use a simpler approach, approximating r¯g as the (simple) average gross
yield on all government money market funds. Both r¯ and r¯g are readily available from data
providers, such as iMoneyNet and Crane Data.19 But this means we are calculating (r¯ − r¯g)
with error.
Measurement error could also arise in (r¯− r¯g) because of amortized cost accounting. We
are using gross fund yields, as reported to iMoneyNet, to approximate r¯ and r¯g. These mea-
sures are based on funds’ valuation of their portfolio securities at amortized cost, whereas the
“idealized” relationship, ELM = r¯ − r¯g, should be calculated from yields based on current
market values (i.e., from mark-to-market values). Consequently, our measure of a fund’s yield
spread will lag behind and be less variable than a fund’s true credit risk (Figure 10).
Slippage might also occur because ELM is itself measured with noise. Some of the secu-
rities prime funds hold are collateralized, asset-backed, or possess credit enhancements, all
of which reduce credit risk. However, our analysis generally ignores these credit-enhancing
features. For example, as indicated in Section 3, we treat asset-backed commercial paper as
equivalent to unsecured commercial paper. This could potentially lead us to overestimate
ELM.
Despite the potential for slippage, the question remains: is the relationship close enough
that (r¯ − r¯g) is a simple, yet useful, guide to a fund’s credit risk? The answer appears to be
“yes”, though within limits. Figure 11 displays a scatter plot ELM against (r¯− r¯g). Most data
points are located near the 45 degree line and there is a strong positive (0.7) correlation between
the two variables. On the other hand, roughly 10 percent of the observations sit at least 10 basis
points above or below the 45 degree line. As a rough guide to a fund’s credit risk, however,
this may be a small price to pay given the complexity and data requirements of calculating a
19To adjust for numerous data entry errors in Form N-MFP fund yields, we import yield information from
iMoneyNet. We use iMoneyNet yield information wherever reasonable.
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CDS-based measure of credit risk such as ELM.
5.2 The Effects of the SEC’s 2010 Reforms on Credit Risk
As noted in the introduction, to increase the resilience of money market funds to shocks in
the wake of the financial crisis, in 2010 the SEC implemented wide-ranging reforms of money
market funds. Among other things, these reforms lowered the maximum allowable WAM for
money market funds from 90 to 60 days. A fund’s WAM is determined by taking the asset-
weighted average of the minimum of the final legal maturity of each of the fund’s securities or
the number of days until the next interest rate reset on that security (if the security is a float-
ing rate instrument). Some research has found that the SEC’s 2010 WAM restrictions reduced
the interest rate risk that money market funds take on. For example, using Monte Carlo sim-
ulations, the SEC (2012) found that the new, lower 60-day limit for fund WAMs reduced the
probability of a fund breaking the dollar. But the effect in that study stems from a reduction in
interest rate risk.
To date, there has been relatively little if any empirical study of how the SEC’s 2010 reforms
affected the credit risk of money market funds. In 2010, the SEC imposed for the first time a
maximum weighted average life (WAL), which the SEC set at 120 days. A fund’s WAL is
determined by the taking the asset-weighted average of the final legal maturity (in days) of
each of a fund’s securities. The SEC also imposed liquidity standards requiring money market
funds to hold at least 10 percent of their assets in securities that are deemed to be liquid within
1 day and another 20 percent in securities that are deemed to be liquid within 7 days, for a total
of 30 percent in “weekly liquid assets.” The liquidity standards, by encouraging funds to hold
greater amounts of Treasury and agency securities, presumably lowered the (private sector)
credit risk that prime money market funds may take on. In addition, if the term structure of
CDS premiums is upward sloping, as is typically the case for high quality credits, the new
liquidity and WAL conditions would also have helped limit the credit risk of prime money
market funds by pushing money market funds’ portfolios inward along the term structure of
CDS premiums.
This section seeks to assess the effects of the SEC’s 2010 reforms on fund WAL and liquid-
ity on the credit risk in prime money market fund portfolios. We would prefer to have data
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on prime funds’ holdings, liquidity, and WALs both before and after January 2010, the month
the SEC adopted its reforms. The SEC, however, did not require funds to begin reporting on
Form N-MFP until November 2010. Before November 2010, only quarterly portfolio holdings
are available for money market funds, which for various reasons are not easily collated. More-
over, WAL and liquidity standards did not exist before the SEC amended Rule 2a-7 in January
2010. As a result, before November 2010, money market funds did not generally report such
measures.
Consequently, to examine the effects of the SEC’s 2010 reforms on money market funds’
credit risk, we conduct a counterfactual. This counterfactual proceeds by undertaking panel
data regressions of ELM on funds’ weekly liquid assets (LIQ), funds’ weighted average lives
(WAL), and other fund characteristics. Using the regression results, and taking LIQ and WAL
during the period of January 2011 to December 2012 as the benchmark, the counterfactual asks
how prime funds’ credit risk might have differed had liquidity been lower and WAL been
higher, as would presumably have been the case before January 2010.
In some of these regressions, we separate LIQ into the part that is invested in government
securities (i.e., those that are Treasury or agency securities or repo-backed by Treasury and
agency securities), GOVLIQ, and the remainder, NONGOVLIQ. In some regressions, we also
replace WAL with NONGOVWAL, which is the WAL of the fund’s non-government securi-
ties. Following Chernenko and Sunderam (2014), we include in these regressions the log of
fund assets and the percentage of fund assets in institutional share classes. These researchers
indicate that these variables are potentially associated with higher levels of credit risk. To con-
trol for time-varying global financial risks, we include in the regressions the averages of 5-year
CDS premiums for banks in each of four different regions: Europe, Japan, Australia, and the
U.S. Finally, we include the residuals from a regression of ELM on (r¯− r¯g) as a control variable
to mitigate the influence of measurement error in ELM.20 For brevity, we report only the co-
efficients on the variables measuring the impact of the 2010 reforms. Full results are available
20As noted in the previous section, ELM f ,t is measured with error, which could lead to coefficient standard
errors that are “too big.” Also measurement error in ELM, if correlated with the explanatory variables, could bias
coefficient estimates (Hyslop and Imbens, 2001). One way to treat such endogeneity is to find a proxy variable for
the unobserved measurement error. We run the regression: ELM f ,t = αDt + β(r¯ f ,t − r¯g,t) + ε f ,t, where Dt are date
fixed effects. We include the residuals from this regression as a proxy for the measurement error in ELM f ,t. These
residuals have non-zero and significant correlation coefficients with several of the explanatory variables, signaling
that endogeneity may indeed be a problem. Any such endogeneity is likely alleviated by the inclusion of these
residuals among the control variables.
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on request.
Results of these panel data regressions are shown in Figure 12. Columns (1) and (2) con-
sider the effects of weekly liquidity. Column (3) considers the joint effects of LIQ and WAL.
Columns (4) includes both LIQ and NONGOVWAL. Finally, column (5) repeats the regression
in column (4), but replaced the dependent variable ELM with the yield spread (r¯− r¯g).
Column (1) indicates that greater liquidity is associated with lower credit risk. The coef-
ficient on LIQ = −0.203 and is statistically significant, which means that in a cross-section
of funds, funds with greater liquidity, as measured by the SEC’s weekly liquidity standard,
have a lower ELM.21 To assess whether imposing a liquidity standard lowered prime fund
credit risk, we approximate weekly liquidity before and after the SEC’s 2010 Reforms from
iMoneyNet data (Figure 13).22 According to the iMoneyNet definition, prime funds’ (simple)
average weekly liquidity rose from 31 percent of assets over 2006-2007 to 48 percent of assets
over 2011-2012. If LIQ rose by that amount (i.e., 17 percent) in response to the SEC’s 2010 re-
forms, the regression indicates that the average prime fund’s credit risk would have declined
by 3.4 basis points, a reduction of about 22 percent relative to the asset-weighted average level
of ELM of 15 basis points from January 2011 to December 2012.
The results in column (2) indicate that most of this estimated decline would have arisen
because, to meet the new liquidity standard, prime funds increased their holdings of Treasury
and agency securities or repo securities backed by Treasury and agency debt. Not all of the
credit effect, however, is due to increased holdings of such securities. The results indicate that
a prime fund that met the new weekly liquidity standard by increasing its holdings of non-
government securities maturing in under 5 business days (NONGOVLIQ) would also have
experienced a reduction in credit risk. For example, the results indicate that a prime fund’s
ELM would have declined 1.1 basis points for a fund that raised NONGOVLIQ from 31 to 48
percent of assets.
21Under the amendments to Rule 2a-7 that the SEC adopted in 2010, funds must also hold 10 percent of their
assets in cash, U.S. Treasury securities or securities that convert to cash the next business day. The percentage of
fund assets held in these securities constitutes the fund’s “daily liquidity.” For brevity, we do not show regressions
using daily liquidity. However, the coefficient on daily liquidity is negative and is economically and statistically
significant.
22Due to data limitations, the iMoneyNet measure is indicative of, but not identical to, the SEC’s definition of
weekly liquidity. The SEC measure (i.e., LIQ) and the iMoneyNet measure of weekly liquidity differ in that the
iMoneyNet measure excludes all U.S. agency securities maturing within 60 days and double counts U.S. Treasury
securities maturing within 7 days. Despite these differences, the iMoneyNet measure is usually within 2 percentage
points of LIQ.
27
Column (3) examines the joint effect of LIQ and WAL on a fund’s credit risk, as measured
by ELM. The coefficient on LIQ remains negative and statistically significant, indeed little dif-
ferent from its level in column (1). The coefficient on WAL = .036 and is statistically significant,
indicating that reducing a fund’s WAL reduces its credit risk and this effect is independent of
changes in a fund’s weekly liquid assets. This regression can be used to evaluate the indepen-
dent effect of the SEC’s 2010 imposition of a WAL limit on the credit risk of prime funds. The
2010 reforms capped a money market fund’s WAL at 120 days. Before the 2010 reforms, WAL
limits did not exist, funds did not publish WALs, and hence, the reduction in fund WALs as a
result of the SEC’s 2010 reforms is unknown. However, before and after 2010, money market
funds were generally prohibited from holding securities with a remaining life of more than 397
days. Thus, we judge the current 120 day WAL limit against a hypothetical fund with a WAL
of 260 days (about half way between 120 and 397 days). Before the SEC’s 2010 reforms, a fund
could have held such a portfolio if the securities were floating rate instruments with a weekly
interest rate reset; the fund’s WAM would have been 7 days, which would not have violated
the then-prevailing WAM limit of 90 days. The regression indicates that the SEC’s imposition
of a WAL limit in 2010 would have reduced the credit risk on the hypothetical fund by 5 basis
points (.036× (120− 260)). We do not know if this is an extreme example. But it does suggest
that a WAL limit can help mitigate a prime fund’s credit risk.
The regression in column (3), however, masks an important detail: a prime fund could
have a large portion of its assets in longer-dated Treasury securities, resulting in a high WAL
(and a high level of weekly liquidity) but very low credit risk (assuming, as we do, that Trea-
sury securities have no default risk). Because of this, the true effect of WAL on a fund’s credit
risk could be distorted. To check for this possibility, column (4) replaces a fund’s WAL with
the WAL calculated only by using a fund’s non-government securities (i.e., excluding Trea-
sury, agency, and repo securities that are backed by Treasury and agency collateral), which we
call NONGOVWAL. The coefficients on both LIQ and NONGOVWAL are statistically signifi-
cant. Moreover, the size of the coefficient on NONGOVWAL is, if anything, bigger than it was
in column (3). This indicates that a reduction in a fund’s WAL arising from non-government
securities significantly lowers a fund’s credit risk, independent of the Rule 2a-7 minimums
on funds’ weekly liquidity. The regression in column (5), which replaces ELM with (r¯ − r¯g),
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shows that these effects continue to hold if we instead use a fund’s prime-to-government yield
spread as the measure of a fund’s credit risk.
To put these effects in context, it would be preferable to test whether ELM declined for
the average fund after the SEC enacted its 2010 reforms. That is not possible because our
primary data source, the SEC’s N-MFP report, did not exist before November 2010. However,
because of the reasonably strong correlation evidenced in Figure 11, we can use (r¯ − r¯g) to
proxy ELM before and after January 2010. Figure 14 shows box and whiskers plots of (r¯− r¯g)
from January 2005 to December 2013 for all prime funds reporting to iMoneyNet. There is
not much evidence of a decline in the average yield spread after January 2010: the median and
interquartile range of (r¯− r¯g) changed little in 2010-2013 compared to 2005-2006 (i.e., before the
housing and financial crises). Considering that, on average, funds held less liquidity before the
reforms (Figure 13), one explanation for the lack of change in yield spreads is that issuers were
perceived to have lower credit risk in the years before the crisis.23 This offset upward pressure
on yield spreads generated by longer average maturities. Nevertheless, the number of funds
in the extreme tails (represented with dots) has fallen dramatically since 2010, reflecting that
the distribution of fund returns has become compressed. A plausible explanation is that the
SEC’s 2010 reforms succeeded in pushing funds with outlying credit risks toward the center of
the distribution. Therefore, even if the 2010 reforms, alone, did not substantively change the
credit risk of the median fund, they may have dramatically lowered the credit risk of funds
in the upper-tail of the distribution.24 Thus, for example, according to the model in Figure 12
and assuming no change in issuer credit quality, a hypothetical fund with an ELM of 40 basis
points before the SEC’s 2010 reforms that increased its weekly liquidity from 18 to 35 percent
(i.e., the bottom quartile in Figure 13) and reduced its WAL by 120 days is predicted to reduce
its ELM by 7.2 basis points. This would represent an 18 percent decline in that hypothetical
fund’s ELM.
In sum, the results in Figure 12 indicate liquidity and credit risk are closely tied. The liquid-
23For example, 1-year CDS premiums on JPMorgan Chase, a substantial issuer of short-term debt to prime MMFs,
averaged just 8 basis points over 2005-2006 compared to 43 basis points over 2011-2012.
24This observation is consistent with SEC (2012), who study the distribution of funds’ weighted average matu-
rities (WAM) pre- and post-reform. They write: “The report documents that the reduction in maximum weighted
average maturity (WAM) from 90 to 60 days did not cause all funds to lower their WAMs. Instead, the largest effect
was on funds that had WAMs above 60 days. For example, the 95th percentile decreased from approximately 70
days at the end of 2009 to approximately 55 days at the end of 2010.”
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ity requirements and WAL limits imposed under the SEC’s 2010 reforms both independently
served to reduce the credit risk in prime money market funds.
6 Conclusion
This paper develops a metric for assessing credit risk in prime money market funds, “expected
loss-to-maturity” or ELM. It is an estimate of the CDS needed to insure a prime fund’s portfo-
lio against credit losses. Using this new metric, we study the evolution of credit risk in prime
funds through the turbulent markets of 2011-2012.
Contrary to some earlier work, our results suggest that an increase in prime funds’ average
credit risk in 2011 is not primarily attributable to funds’ European bank exposure. Beginning
in June 2011, prime money market funds’ efforts to reduce both the size and maturity of their
investments in European banks largely counteracted the effect of rising European bank credit
risks. At the same time, prime funds’ shifted assets toward banks in the Asia/Pacific region,
which also had sharply rising CDS premiums as fears of eurozone contagion and global eco-
nomic conditions worsened. This shift is primarily responsible for the jump in prime funds’
average ELM over late-2011. Still, the rise in average ELM to 21 basis points in November
2011 (compared to an average of 15 basis points over 2011-2012), was small compared to the
increases in 5-year CDS premiums on large financial institutions over the same period.
The concept of ELM can also be used to assess the cost of insuring a fund against mounting
correlated losses. Using a t-copula approach to account for correlated defaults, we calculate by
Monte Carlo the cost of insuring a fund against losses of more than 50 basis points and up to
300 basis points. The cost of this “break the dollar” insurance, BDI(50, 300), averaged 7 basis
points over 2011-2012. This is substantially lower than the average cost of insuring the fund
against any and all loses (15 basis points). Interestingly, this estimate for BDI is in the range
of fees the U.S. Treasury assessed under its 2008-2009 temporary guarantee program (6 to 8.8
basis points at an annual rate).
Finally, we find evidence that the SEC’s 2010 reforms, which imposed new and stricter
portfolio maturity requirements and required funds to hold a given percent of their funds
in liquid assets, reduced credit risk in prime funds. More broadly, our results suggest that
regulators and fund managers can influence the credit risk of fund portfolios by altering the
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maturities of portfolio securities.
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Appendix 1: Monte Carlo Simulation of BDI(0, 300) and BDI(50, 300)
1. Using default probabilities collected from RMI, for each issuer i in the fund’s portfolio:
(a) Set pi(0) = 0
(b) Linearly interpolate pi(Tj) for all days Tj, where Tj ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 720) and
T /∈ {30, 60, 90, 180, 270, 360, 540, 720}
(c) Calculate the annualized default probability p˜i(Tj) = 1−
[
1− pi(Tj)
] 360/Tj
2. Create the correlation matrix Λ to be used in the copula. Following Tarashev and Zhu
(2008), we approximate the correlation matrix Λ as corr(∆lnDi,∆lnDj) where ∆lnDi, is
the (log) distance-to-default. They show that corr(∆lnDi,∆lnDj)≈ corr[∆Φ−1( p˜i),∆Φ−1( p˜j))]
where Φ−1(•) is the inverse cumulative normal distribution, and ∆Φ−1( p˜i) is month-to-
month change in Φ−1( p˜i). As described in Section 3, we have 24 months of data, 8 dif-
ferent maturities per month, and about 100 unique “high level” issuers. Without some
restrictions, Λ would be very large. Consequently, we assume that Λ is constant across
time and maturities. We also set to zero any correlation with a p-value> .10; in effect, we
are assuming that if a correlation is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level, it
is zero.
3. Do m = 1 to M simulations for each fund:
(a) Draw a vector of k = 1, 2, . . . K random variates zk from a multivariate t-distribution
tυ(0,Λ), which has a mean vector of zero, a correlation matrix of Λ and υ degrees of
freedom. To do this, we must use a Cholesky decomposition of Λ, which requires
Λ to be positive definite. To ensure that Λ is indeed positive definite, we follow
Rebonato and Jackel (1999) adjusting the eigenvalues of Λ as necessary by very
small amounts.
(b) Calculate uk = t−1(zk) where t−1(•) is the inverse cumulative t-distribution.
(c) For each issuer i for each date, set:
Y
Tj
i = 0 i f uk > p˜i(Tj)
Y
Tj
i = 1 i f uk ≤ p˜i(Tj)
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When Y
Tj
i = 1, issuer i is assumed to have defaulted before security j matures. This
is equivalent to testing whether tk < Tj where tk is a simulated time-to-default on
issuer i and Tj is the remaining maturity on security j. Since uk is calculated on
the basis of p˜i(Tj), this is equivalent to assuming that if a security does not default
before maturity, the fund simply rolls that security over into an identical issue. If the
security defaults, the fund suffers a loss and such losses are accumulated, but the
defaulted security is not replaced by a comparable security. Thus, this approach has
elements in common with the BIS approach of assuming a “constant risk portfolio”
when measuring Incremental Risk Capital.
(d) For each fund for each date, from m = 1 to M:
i. calculate Loss =
[
∑Ii=1 ∑
J
j=1 wij(1− Ri)Y
Tj
i
]
ii. for m = 1, set Am−1 = 0
iii. if Loss > 50 basis points, deliver Am ← [Am−1 +min(Loss− l, u)]
iv. else if Loss ≤ 50 basis points, deliver Am ← [Am−1 + 0]
(e) End of m loop.
4. Set BDI(l, u)← AMM
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Figure 1: Yield Spread between Prime and Government MMFs
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Figure 2: Prime MMF Securities Holdings, January 2011
Security type category Assets (billions of $) % of prime fund assets
Total 1343.7 100.0%
Commercial paper (CP) & Other Notes 414.3 30.8%
Financial CP 197.0 14.7%
Asset-backed CP 111.2 8.3%
Other CP 30.7 2.3%
Variable rate demand notes 9.8 0.7%
Other notes 65.5 4.9%
Bank CDs 477.3 35.5%
Treasury and agencies 180.6 13.4%
Agency securities 68.4 5.1%
Treasuries 112.2 8.4%
Repurchase Agreements 216.2 16.1%
Treasury & agency repo 34.3 2.6%
Treasury repo 91.4 6.8%
Other repo 90.5 6.7%
Other 55.4 4.1%
Other instruments 55.1 4.1%
Municipal securities 0.2 0.0%
Source: authors’ tabulation of SEC Form N-MFP reports
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Figure 3: Securities Held by Prime Money Market Funds, By Region/Country
January 2011, Billions of dollars
Region/Country Assets (billions of $) % of prime fund assets
Total $1,343.7 100.0%
Americas 479.6 35.7%
USA 379.0 28.2%
Canada 100.4 7.5%
Chile 0.3 <0.1%
Europe 695.4 51.8%
France 200.0 14.9%
UK 147.3 11.0%
Germany 110.9 8.3%
Netherlands 67.2 5.0%
Switzerland 54.8 4.1%
Sweden 44.2 3.3%
Norway 15.9 1.2%
Italy 15.3 1.1%
Belgium 13.7 1.0%
Denmark 12.3 0.9%
Spain 12.0 0.9%
Luxembourg 0.8 0.1%
Austria 0.6 <0.1%
Finland 0.1 <0.1%
Ireland 0.1 <0.1%
Asia/Pacific 163.4 12.2%
Australia/New Zealand 84.9 6.3%
Japan 78.3 5.8%
Korea 0.1 <0.1%
Other 5.3 0.4%
39
Figure 4: Expected Loss-to-Maturity (ELM) for Prime MMFs
Expected loss−to−maturity (ELM) for prime MMFs:
average Jan 2011 to Dec 2012: 15 basis points
Prime−to−government fund yield spread:
average Jan 2011 to Dec 2012: 13 basis points
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Source: iMoneyNet.com; authors’ calculations
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Figure 6: Weighted Average Life (WAL) for Prime MMFs, 2011, by Region
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Figure 8: 5-Year CDS Premiums for Banks, by Region, 2011
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Note: The CDS premium for European financials is the iTraxx senior financial index for Europe.
The CDS premium for large Japanese banks is the simple average of 5-year CDS premiums for
Sumitomo Bank and Mizuho Bank. The CDS premium for large Australian banks is the simple
average of 5-year CDS premiums for National Australia Bank, Westpac, and ANZ.
Figure 9: Expected Cost of Break-the-Dollar Insurance BDI(0, 300) and BDI(50, 300)
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Note: the figure plots asset-weighted average ELM against asset-weighted averages of BDI(0,300)
and BDI(50,300) for prime funds. Estimates are annualized costs. BDI(0,300) and BDI(50,300)
are calculated by Monte Carlo using a t-copula with 5 degrees of freedom using 50,000 random
draws per fund per month.
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Figure 10: Distribution of ELM and Yield Spread (r¯− r¯g) by Fund, Jan 2011-Dec 2012
This figure shows box-and-whisker plots of ELM and yield spread (r¯ − r¯g), respectively, across funds
by month. Rectangles represents the interquartile range (IQR), which extends from the 25th to 75th
percentile, and the median is the horizontal line in the middle of the rectangle. The ends in the lines ex-
tending from below and above the rectangle represent the minimum and maximum values in the ranges
from Q1− 1.5 ∗ IQR to Q1 and from Q3 to Q3+ 1.5 ∗ IQR, respectively. If observations exist outside of
this range (i.e., in the top or bottom 0.35 percentiles of a normal distribution), they are considered to be
outliers and are denoted with a dot.
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Figure 11: Scatter Plot: ELM vs. Yield Spread (r¯− r¯g)
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Note: The red dashed line is the 45 degree line.
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Figure 12: Regressions of ELM on Liquidity
This figure seeks to assess the effects of the 2010 reforms’ maturity and liquidity provisions on the credit
risk in prime money market fund portfolios. To do this, we undertake panel data regressions of ELM
on fund portfolio characteristics across all sample prime funds, analyzed monthly over the 2011-2012
period. Explanatory variables include a fund’s weekly liquid assets, LIQ, as defined under SEC Rule
2a-7, and a fund’s weighted average life, WAL. We also study the maturity profile of a fund’s “gov”
and “nongov” investments, where “gov” investments include only treasury, agency, and repo securities
collateralized by treasury and agency securities (GOVLIQ); meanwhile, “nongov” investments exclude
these security types (NONGOVLIQ, and NONGOVWAL). To control for time-varying global financial
risks (which likely affect the credit risks of prime funds generally), we include the average CDS premi-
ums of banks in Europe, Japan, Australia/New Zealand, and the U.S., separately, in all regressions (not
shown for brevity). We also control for (but do not show) the log of fund assets and the percentage of
fund assets in institutional share classes. Finally, to treat the possible endogeneity discussed in footnote
20, we include (but do not show) a proxy for the measurement error in ELM in regressions (1)-(4). This
proxy equals the residuals from a regression of ELM on (r¯− r¯g). In column (5), the dependent variable
is yield spread (r¯− r¯g) and results are similar. Standard errors are clustered by fund. Estimates with a
p-value below 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 are marked with a *, **, and ***, respectively.
ELM (r¯− r¯g)
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 0.932 1.717 -0.828 -4.327 1.177
(3.802) (3.271) (3.844) (3.199) (4.912)
LIQ -0.203*** -0.172*** -0.145*** -0.183***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.019) (0.028)
GOVLIQ -0.233***
(0.021)
NONGOVLIQ -0.064***
(0.022)
WAL 0.036**
(0.014)
NONGOVWAL 0.114*** 0.107***
(0.016) (0.015)
Adj. R2 0.73 0.77 0.74 0.77 0.43
N 3,065 3,065 3,065 3,065 3,065
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Figure 13: Weekly Liquidity Pre- and Post-Reform
This figure shows the distribution of prime MMFs’ weekly liquidity as a percentage assets on a monthly
basis over two periods: 2006-2007 (pre-reform) and 2011-2012 (post-reform). Because SEC Form N-
MFP is not available before November 2010, in this figure only, weekly liquidity is approximated from
iMoneyNet data. It is measured as the sum of investments maturing within 7 days and investments in
U.S. Treasury securities. Treasury securities maturing within 7 days are double counted. Investments
in U.S. government agency securities are not counted. Tests reveal that this metric is generally within 2
percentage points of actual Rule 2a-7 weekly liquidity (LIQ) and is, therefore, a good approximation of
weekly liquidity over the two periods being examined.
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Figure 14: Distribution of Prime Yield Spread (r¯− r¯g) Pre- and Post-Reform
This figure shows box-and-whisker plots of yield spread (r¯− r¯g) across funds, monthly, over
2005-2013. Rectangles represent the interquartile range (IQR), which extends from the 25th to
75th percentile, and the median is the horizontal line in the middle of the rectangle. The ends in
the lines extending from below and above the rectangle represent the minimum and maximum
values in the ranges from Q1− 1.5 ∗ IQR to Q1 and from Q3 to Q3 + 1.5 ∗ IQR, respectively.
If observations exist outside of this range (i.e. in the top or bottom 0.35 percentiles of a normal
distribution), they are considered to be outliers and are denoted with a dot.
Note: The sample for this chart includes iMoneyNet’s full sample of prime money market funds (i.e. this sample is larger than the
sample used in Figure 10, which includes only those funds for which ELMs could be calculated). Four outlying yield observations
from iMoneyNet were omitted due to possible errors. All yields are gross, simple, and annualized.
Source: iMoneyNet; authors’ calculations.
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